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Congress, the Courts, and Party 
Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks 
the President and Why the Courts Should Not 
Take Congress’s Place 
Neal Devins∗ 
This essay will make two points about Congress-President 
relations—one is clearly right and the other is debatable. One 
point (clearly right) is that Congress is generally uninterested in 
the Constitution, especially with regard to asserting its 
institutional prerogatives and checking presidential unilateralism. 
This was largely the case before polarization set in (around 1995) 
and polarization has significantly exacerbated this phenomenon. In 
particular, lawmakers from the president’s political party no 
longer assert institutional prerogatives to resist presidential 
encroachments; consequently, Congress cannot act in a 
bipartisan way to block presidential initiatives. The second point 
(debatable) is that courts should not relax standing to sue 
limitations so that disappointed lawmakers can take their 
grievances to the judiciary when Congress is unable to stand up 
for itself. Polarization may make it harder for Congress to check 
the president, but polarization also cuts against lawmakers (or 
even institutional counsel) speaking Congress’s voice in court.1 
More than that, polarization has fueled the growing perception 
that the court itself is polarized and politicized—so much so that 
the courts have good reason to steer from this political thicket. 
In making these points, I will focus my attention on how 
Congress turns to the courts to assert its institutional 
prerogatives. Section I will talk generally about structural and 
practical limits to Congress advancing a pro-Congress theory of 
either statutory or constitutional interpretation before the courts. 
 
 ∗ Sandra Day O’Connor Professor of Law and Professor of Government, William and 
Mary School of Law. Thanks to Tom Campbell for asking me to be a part of this 
symposium and for his insights. 
 1 When a House or Senate committee seeks to enforce a subpoena in court, the 
committee is speaking its own voice and not Congress’s voice. See Tara Leigh Grove & 
Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
571, 622 (2014). For this reason, the broader point I make against lawmaker efforts to 
speak Congress’s voice in court does not apply to committee enforcement of subpoenas. 
See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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The centralization of litigation authority in the Department of 
Justice is a manifestation of these limits. Section I will also 
explain how it is that Congress sought to combat these limits in 
separation of powers disputes with the executive—giving itself 
some institutional voice in court by creating the Office of House 
Counsel and the Senate Office of Legal Counsel. Section II will 
examine how both lawmakers and institutional counsel have 
become less and less interested in separation of powers disputes 
as Congress has become more polarized. In particular, 
lawmakers have shifted away from institutional pursuits and 
toward the pursuit of social issues that divide the parties. In 
making this point, I will also highlight how party polarization 
has transformed Congress—from mildly disinclined to think 
about its institutional prerogatives under the Constitution, to 
outright uninterested in protecting its role in our system of 
divided government. Correspondingly, lawmakers of the 
president’s party no longer use their oversight authority to check 
the president; lawmakers of the opposition party see oversight 
principally as a vehicle to embarrass their political opponents. 
Section III will consider the ramifications of increasing party 
polarization on the standing of lawmakers and institutional 
counsel in disputes with the executive. These disputes are 
increasingly visible; opposition party lawmakers have strong 
incentive to discredit the president and frustrate his agenda. 
Litigation is a visible, low cost way to pursue their interests. For 
this very reason, however, litigation exacerbates polarization and 
threatens the judiciary. The judicial role in checking the 
executive should not expand to take into account Congress’s 
failure to assert its institutional prerogatives through traditional 
Article I devices, most notably, oversight and legislation.2 
I. WHY CONGRESS (PRETTY MUCH) LEAVES IT TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO DEFEND CONGRESS’S INTERESTS 
IN COURT3 
The competing incentives of the president and Congress 
explain both Congress’s disinterest in asserting its institutional 
 
 2 My argument will be limited to the question of whether polarization—as a policy 
matter—cuts in favor of more expansive standing for lawmakers and institutional 
counsel. I will not engage in constitutional analysis to ascertain the appropriate scope of 
lawmaker or institutional standing. For recent treatments of this constitutional question, 
see Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311 (2014); 
Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
339 (2015); and Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1253 (2017). 
 3 This Section builds on and occasionally borrows from earlier writings of mine, 
most notably, Neal Devins, Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1495 (2017). 
Do Not Delete 3/11/18 3:22 PM 
2018] Congress, the Courts, and Party Polarization 57 
prerogatives and the related dynamics of Congress’s interface 
with both the executive and the courts. To start, presidents are 
well positioned to simultaneously advance policy goals and 
expand the power of the presidency. In particular, presidents 
always claim they are constitutionally authorized to pursue 
favored policy positions and, as such, presidents are consistent 
and persistent advocates of executive power. Political scientists 
Terry Moe and William Howell put it this way: “[W]hen 
presidents feel it is in their political interests, they can 
put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both in 
gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of 
their power.”4 
For its part, Congress possesses ample weapons to defend its 
institutional interests, but has little incentive to make use 
of these tools. While each of Congress’s 535 members have 
some stake in Congress as an institution, lawmakers regularly 
trade-off their interest in Congress as a strong, vibrant 
institution. They put aside institutional interests in favor of their 
interests in reelection, in serving on a desired committee, in 
assuming a position of leadership in their party, or in advancing 
their and their constituents’ policy goals. Lawmakers, in other 
words, are “trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might benefit if 
they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power, 
but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the 
local constituency.”5 
This collective action problem stymies Congress in two 
distinctive ways. First (and most obviously), lawmakers have 
little interest in defending congressional prerogatives. On war 
powers, for example, lawmakers rarely assert Congress’s 
constitutional powers. In particular, today’s military is all 
volunteer and generally supportive of presidential power; 
lawmakers feel little constituent or public pressure to reign in 
presidential warmaking.6 Consequently, notwithstanding the 
clear constitutional mandate that Congress “declare war,”7 
lawmakers often find it more convenient to acquiesce to 
presidential unilateralism than to face criticism that they 
obstructed a necessary military operation.8 
 
 4 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999). 
 5 Id. at 144. 
 6 Neal Devins, Bring Back the Draft?, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2003). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 8 See LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 166–68 
(2000). For this very reason, institutionally-minded members of Congress have turned to 
the courts to preserve their constitutional powers. For one prominent example, see 
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000), which holds that members of 
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Second, the policy interests of lawmakers are not necessarily 
in sync with the institutional interests of Congress. Lawmakers 
opposed to legislation on policy grounds often embrace a narrow 
view of congressional power. Indeed, constitutional objections to 
legislation are typically raised by lawmakers and those who 
oppose legislation on policy grounds.9 Examples abound, 
including the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, 
and the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act. Lawmakers opposed 
to these statutes filed briefs arguing that Congress was without 
constitutional authority to enact these measures. 10  
With little interest in abstract discussions of legislative 
power, there clearly is no appetite for pursuing institutional 
goals such as enhancing pro-Congress interpretations of the 
Constitution or federal statutes. Likewise, lawmakers have little 
interest in contemplating potential judicial review of their 
handiwork—policy goals are pursued when a bill is enacted and a 
court decision striking down legislation is seen as an opportunity 
to reassert policy priorities through the enactment of new 
legislation.11 When amending legislation in the wake of a judicial 
decision, lawmakers do not engage with the courts; they rather 
“make[] clear concessions to the Court’s decision” by embracing 
the same policy through alternative means.12 As Second Circuit 
Judge Robert Katzmann put it, “Congress is largely oblivious of 
the well-being of the judiciary as an institution.”13 Consider, for 
example, issues of statutory interpretation that cut to the core of 
congressional priorities and prerogatives. The simple fact is that 
“[n]o one ever lost an election by saying ‘I’m for purposivism’”;14 
 
Congress could not sue President Bill Clinton for alleged violations of the War Powers 
Resolution in his handling of the war in Yugoslavia. For additional discussion, see infra 
Section III, which argues that institutionally-focused lawsuits are a rarity and that most 
lawmakers seek partisan advantage through litigation. 
 9 See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE 
IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 143–44 (2004). 
 10 See generally Neal Devins, Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons 
from Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933 (2015). 
For reasons I will detail in Section II, polarization exacerbates this phenomenon, as 
today’s lawmakers are more apt to file briefs and make other formal declaration that 
Congress has exceeded its powers. 
 11 See PICKERILL, supra note 9, at 23. 
 12 Id. at 49. 
 13 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 
7 (1988). 
 14 Victoria F. Nourse, Overrides: The Super-Study, 92 TEX. L. REV. 205, 214 (2014). 
In 2016, congressional Republicans pursued legislation that would eviscerate judicial 
deference to agency interpretations. See Vikram David Amar, Chevron Deference and the 
Proposed “Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016”: A Sign of the Times, 
JUSTIA: VERDICT (July 26, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/07/26/chevron-deference-
proposed-separation-powers-restoration-act-2016-sign-times [http://perma.cc/DVG4-WFF9]. 
When introduced, this bill—which was never taken up in the Senate—sought to call 
attention to the “lawless” Obama administration; lawmakers were not concerned with 
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and with no constituency payoff, there is no lawmaker interest 
in thinking about statutory interpretation techniques used by 
the courts. 
A. Congress and the Department of Justice  
Another manifestation of lawmaker uninterest in 
institutional power, including judicial review of Congress’s 
handiwork, is the centralization of litigation authority in the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). First, although the defense of 
federal statutes is an executive function,15 Congress limits its 
influence over legal arguments made in court by centralizing 
litigation authority this way. Second (and somewhat relatedly), 
the entity within Congress that oversees the Justice Department 
(the House and Senate Judiciary Committees) have incentive to 
embrace judicial supremacy—potentially at the expense of pro-
Congress theories of interpretation. Neither of these claims is 
obvious, so let me provide more details. 
First, by centralizing litigation authority in the DOJ, subject 
matter committees in Congress focus their energies on 
policymaking; for most lawmakers, what matters is direct 
influence through the writing of laws, the holding of hearings, 
and related investigations.16 Unlike legislation and oversight, 
legal arguments made in court are abstract and indirect. 
Historically, however, Congress understood that decentralized 
lawyering enhanced lawmaker power vis-à-vis the executive. 
Before 1870, there was no DOJ; before 1933, powerful agency 
solicitors controlled statutory and administrative legal 
arguments.17 These solicitors had strong ties with congressional 
oversight committees and, at this time, oversight committees 
held greater sway with executive branch legal arguments.18 
Recognizing the costs of decentralization to executive power, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt reorganized executive branch 
litigation, transferring litigation authority from agency solicitors 
 
congressional power, and indeed the bill sought to sift power to the courts, not Congress. 
In July 2017, the bill was reintroduced by Senate Republicans. See Press Release, 
Orrin Hatch, Senate Leaders Introduce Bill to Restore Regulatory Accountability 
(July 19, 2017), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/7/senate-leaders-
introduce-bill-to-restore-regulatory-accountability [http://perma.cc/R32G-23RD]. 
 15 For reasons why I think this is so, see Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 625. For a 
competing perspective, see Jack M. Beermann, Congress’s (Less) Limited Power to 
Represent Itself in Court: A Comment on Grove and Devins, 99 CORN. L. REV. ONLINE 166, 
168 (2014). 
 16 See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White 
House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219 (1998). 
 17 See NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 62–63 (1992). 
 18 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 207. 
Do Not Delete 3/11/18 3:22 PM 
60 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
to the DOJ.19 In so doing, presidents—through their Attorneys 
General—have greater control of the administrative state. In 
particular, unlike agency solicitors (who are more beholden to 
oversight committee chairs than to the White House), the 
Attorney General is typically a close political ally of the 
president, often involved in the president’s personal and political 
life.20 Correspondingly, since the mission of DOJ attorneys is to 
defend the interests of the United States (rather than a single 
agency whose interests may be in conflict with other agencies), 
there is less chance that either narrow constituent interests or 
congressional committees will capture the DOJ. Indeed, 
defenders of centralized litigation authority highlight the 
perceived need for the government to make consistent legal 
arguments across a range of cases.21 More to the point, “DOJ 
attorneys may well see the president as their client.”22 Indeed, as 
Sai Prakash and I have examined in our study of DOJ refusals to 
defend federal statutes, the DOJ fends off agency rivals and 
thereby enhances its status within the executive by advancing a 
pro-president legal policy agenda.23 
Congress’s willingness to go along with DOJ control of 
litigation is a byproduct of the intensity of preferences within 
Congress and the executive branch. For reasons already noted, 
presidents push for centralization of litigation authority in the 
DOJ. The DOJ too is a fierce advocate for centralization; the 
power and prestige of the DOJ is tied to litigation authority, 
and the DOJ’s preference to control litigation far exceeds 
departmental and agency interests in decentralized 
arrangements. After all, agency heads have substantial power to 
advance policy preferences through their power to regulate and 
 
 19 See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
256–58 (1996). 
 20 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219. 
 21 For a summary of DOJ arguments in support of centralized litigation authority, 
see The Attorney General’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 
47 (1982). For a fuller presentation and critique of those arguments, see Neal Devins & 
Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558 (2003). 
 22 Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Government 
Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1987). 
The DOJ, however, is not simply a lackey of the president; witness, in particular, the 
battle between President Trump and his DOJ. 
 23 See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 537–59 (2012); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, 
Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 
1105–06 (2013). In making this point, a distinction must be drawn between DOJ efforts to 
advance the president’s legal policy agenda and possible DOJ investigations into criminal 
conduct by high-ranking executive officials. The power of the DOJ is hinged both to its 
advocacy of the executive’s legal policy agenda and its reputation for neutrality in the 
pursuit of criminal investigations. 
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their work with congressional committees in shaping federal 
law.24 More significantly, the DOJ’s overseers in Congress are 
strong supporters of centralization. The power of the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees is significantly moored to the 
power of the DOJ and, as such, the Judiciary Committees look for 
ways to strengthen DOJ control of litigation. For example, when 
other congressional committees contemplate shifting litigation 
authority away from DOJ and to a regulatory agency, the 
Judiciary Committees fight back. Michael Herz and I recount 
several such episodes in our study of DOJ centralization of 
litigation authority, including fights between the House 
Judiciary and Energy and Commerce Committees regarding the 
enforcement of environmental laws.25 
The interests of the DOJ and Judiciary Committees also 
coalesce on judicial supremacy. Both are strong advocates of 
judicial power as the power of the DOJ and Judiciary 
Committees is moored to the courts. When the federal courts play 
a significant policy-making role, the power of the DOJ to speak 
the government’s voice is at its apex, as is the power of the 
Judiciary Committees to oversee the DOJ. For this very reason, 
the DOJ embraces a duty to defend federal statutes that sees the 
Supreme Court as speaking the last word on the Constitution’s 
meaning; as a result, the Senate Judiciary Committee typically 
demands that Solicitor General and Attorney General nominees 
formally commit to the defense of federal statutes.26 
Furthermore, Judiciary Committee members demonstrate 
respect for basic legal principles, “adher[ing] to formal rules 
against interfering in any way with ongoing litigation, and 
maintain[ing] a general policy that no bill should take effect 
retroactively.”27 In other words, unlike power committees who 
pay no attention to potential judicial roadblocks to favored 
policy initiatives, the Judiciary Committees are court-centric 
and conform to—rather than challenge—judicial limits on 
congressional power.28 
 
 24 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219 (explaining why agencies do not see 
litigation authority as core to their powers); see also Devins, supra note 3, at 1528–30 
(highlighting agency role in drafting legislation). 
 25 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 221–22. 
 26 For a discussion of DOJ views, see The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and 
Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275 (1980). For a 
general discussion of the incentives of the DOJ, Congress, and the White House, see 
Devins & Prakash, supra note 23, at 538–59. 
 27 Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees, 3 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 317, 338 (1993). 
 28 See id. at 317–62 (contrasting House Judiciary Committee to Energy and 
Commerce Committee). 
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B. Congress in Court  
The fact that Congress largely leaves it to the DOJ to speak 
the government’s voice in court does not mean that lawmakers 
never turn to the courts for recourse. In Section II, I will discuss 
lawmaker amicus filings as well as the practices of institutional 
counsel for the House and Senate—analysis that will highlight 
how party polarization has contributed to declining lawmaker 
interest in Congress’s institutional authority vis-à-vis the 
president. In Section III, I will discuss court-imposed limits on 
the standing of disappointed lawmakers to defend Congress’s 
institutional prerogatives. For the balance of this section, 
I will examine the political conditions that led to the 
establishment of institutional counsel—conditions that speak to 
the circumstances when Congress will overcome the disincentives 
that typically result in lawmaker disinterest in Congress’s 
institutional authority. 
The Office of Senate Legal Counsel was created by statute in 
1978 as part of Watergate-era reforms to bolster congressional 
interests in separation of powers disputes; the Office of House 
Counsel was created by an administrative directive of the House 
Speaker Tip O’Neill in 1976.29 Differences between the two offices 
reflect differences in the chambers. The House is controlled by 
the majority party and the House counsel essentially works for 
the majority party.30 Senate norms traditionally favor 
bipartisanship and the Senate counsel acts at the behest of a 
supermajority of members from both parties.31 Indeed, Senate 
norms of bipartisanship explain the unwillingness of the House 
to sign onto a joint congressional counsel that would serve both 
 
 29 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 608–14. In addition to creating an Office of 
Senate Legal Counsel, Congress also mandates that the DOJ notify that office when it 
would not defend federal statutes (principally so that institutional counsel could defend 
congressional interests in separation of powers disputes). See 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2006) 
(allowing the Senate counsel—when authorized—to appear in legal actions regarding “the 
powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution”). The House 
Bipartisanship Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) directs the House counsel. See Grove & 
Devins, supra note 1, at 618. The BLAG is controlled by the majority party and has 
always backed majority party preferences. 
 30 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618–19. In litigation defending the Defense 
of Marriage Act, the House counsel responded to Democratic complaints that it did not 
speak the voice of the entire House by acknowledging that it represents the views of the 
majority party. Id. In lower court filings, the counsel stated that although it “seeks 
consensus whenever possible, it functions on a majoritarian basis, like the institution it 
represents.” E.g., Brief for Defendant–Appellant the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of 
the United States House of Representatives, Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (No. 12-2335), 2012 WL 3647722, at *3 n.1. 
 31 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 612–21 (noting that Senate counsel action 
must be approved by two-thirds of a group made up of four members of the majority party 
and three members of the minority party). 
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chambers and serve as a bulwark against presidential power.32 
Notwithstanding arguments that “[n]either House acting alone 
can assert the prerogative of representing the Congress,”33 House 
leadership feared that a nonpartisan joint office might not give 
voice to majority preferences in the House. 
The willingness of lawmakers to back the creation of an 
Office of Senate Legal Counsel to advance the Senate’s 
institutional interests in the courts is a byproduct of unique 
political circumstances—so much so that the creation of this 
office is the exception, which proves the rule of lawmaker 
disinterest in protecting their institutional prerogatives. During 
the Watergate era (1972–1978), Democrats occupied every 
ideological niche and there were several liberal Republicans.34 
For this reason, George Wallace justified his third-party bid for 
the presidency by claiming that “there was not a ‘dime’s worth of 
difference’ between the two parties.”35 Senate committees, for 
example, often made use of unified staff—rather than divide staff 
by majority or minority party.36 With no meaningful ideological 
gap between the parties, bipartisanship was possible and 
Congress sometimes saw itself as an institution with a distinctive 
set of interests that set it apart from the White House. 
Nonetheless, lawmakers still needed to see personal political 
advantage in asserting Congress’s institutional interests and, as 
such, the previously discussed collective action problem typically 
stood as a roadblock to Congress’s asserting institutional 
interests, especially on matters as abstract as litigation 
authority. Watergate, however, made fears of presidential 
overreach politically salient and lawmakers rallied behind 
several significant legislative proposals designed to limit 
the president and protect Congress.37 Congress enacted the 
 
 32 See id. at 612–13; see also Rebecca Mae Salokar, Legal Counsel for Congress: 
Protecting Institutional Interests, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 131 (1993). 
 33 Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest 
Matters: Hearing on S. 555 Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95TH CONG. 61 
(1977) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk, D–S.D.). 
 34 See SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 27–35 (2008); see 
also STEVEN S. SMITH & GERALD GAMM, The Dynamics of Party Government in 
Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 147–49 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce L. Oppenheimer 
eds., 9th ed. 2009). 
 35 Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79 in Alabama, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 15, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1998/09/15/ex-gov-george-
c-wallace-dies-at-79-in-alabama/f77a36e4-0689-4086-9b96-b0d9a293cd57/?utm_term=.f39 
de6268e8c [http://perma.cc/4CEW-DRM5]. 
 36 See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons 
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1543 (2005). 
 37 See Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why 
Today’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 401–06 (2009). 
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War Powers Resolution (overriding a presidential veto),38 the 
1974 Impoundment Control Act,39 and the 1978 Ethics in 
Government Act.40 All these statutes were politically popular; all 
these statutes responded to presidential overreach of core 
legislative powers. 
In Section II, I will explain why today’s Congress lacks the 
will and the way to assert institutional prerogative against the 
executive. Before doing so, let me close this section out 
by highlighting ways that institutional counsel—before 
polarization set in—defended congressional prerogatives in court. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, lawmakers were more willing to embrace 
a unified view of Congress’s institutional prerogatives. In 
particular, rather than see themselves as Democrats or 
Republicans, lawmakers were sanguine with institutional 
counsel defending the constitutionality of federal statutes or 
seeking to enforce committee subpoenas against executive 
officials. Consider, for example, Congress’s participation in two 
Reagan-era separation of powers disputes, Immigration 
and Naturalization Services v. Chadha (legislative veto) and 
Bowsher v. Synar (deficit reduction).41 In both cases, counsel for 
the House and Senate participated in oral arguments and filed 
briefs supporting Congress.42 In both cases, party identity did 
not matter—majority Democrats in Chadha initially litigated 
the dispute against the Carter administration; majority 
Senate Republicans litigated the Synar dispute against the 
Reagan administration.43  
The ability and willingness of institutional counsel to 
advance Congress’s institutional interests in a bipartisan way, as 
we will see, stands in stark contrast to practices in today’s 
polarized Congress. At the same time, the participation of 
institutional counsel in earlier separation of powers disputes 
should not be seen as a departure from this section’s central 
claims about lawmaker uninterest in institutional authority 
and lawmaker acquiescence to judicial supremacy. To start, 
institutional counsel embraced separation of powers litigation 
and believed in judicial supremacy. At the time of Chadha 
and Bowsher, the status of the lawyers in these offices 
 
 38 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (1973). 
 39 Impoundment Control Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 682–88 (1974). 
 40 Ethics in Government Act, P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978). 
 41 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 42 See Devins, supra note 10, at 950. 
 43 In Chadha, no member of Congress filed an amicus brief. In Bowsher, there were 
two amicus briefs filed—one in support of the statute and one in opposition of the statute. 
These briefs were bipartisan. See id. at 1017–19. 
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hinged on their participation in marque separation of powers 
disputes—high profile cases where they were arguing against top 
DOJ lawyers, cases which often made their way to the Supreme  
Court.44 In the case of the Senate counsel, the very purpose of her 
office was to provide a bipartisan institutional voice to Senate 
interests in separation of powers disputes against the 
president.45 Likewise, the power of these lawyers derives from 
the power of the courts; institutional counsel pursue high 
visibility cases in court and embrace the Court’s power to say 
what the law is. For their part, lawmakers in the pre-polarization 
era were generally uninterested in the work of institutional 
counsel and acquiesced to a system that largely ran itself. In 
other words, after lawmakers put in place institutional counsel in 
the Watergate era, lawmakers did not see these offices as 
partisan tools and passively went along with the efforts of these 
offices to advance Congress’s institutional interests in court.46 
II. HOW PARTY POLARIZATION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO GROWING 
LAWMAKER DISINTEREST IN CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVES  
Section I highlighted the collective action problem that limits 
lawmaker interest in institutional power disputes, including 
lawmaker support of DOJ control of government litigation. 
Section I also explained the creation of institutional counsel for 
Congress in the Watergate era, highlighting how the political 
salience of presidential power disputes overcame collective action 
limitations. In this section, I will focus on today’s polarized 
Congress. I will highlight how polarization exacerbates the 
collective action problem. I will also look to changing practices in 
both institutional counsel litigation and lawmaker amicus filings 
to document the diminishing salience of institutional power 
disputes to members of Congress. 
A. Polarization and the Collective Action Problem  
Polarization diminishes the ability of lawmakers to work 
together to defend Congress’s institutional prerogatives. Unlike 
the Watergate era, today’s lawmakers increasingly identify with 
party-defined messages and seek to gain power by advancing 
 
 44 I speak from personal experience. In 1985, I had preliminary conversations with 
then-Senate counsel Mike Davidson about working in his office. 
 45 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 611–13. 
 46 I certainly do not mean to suggest that all lawmakers were disengaged in 
separation of powers disputes. During the pre-polarization period, there were certainly 
institutionally-minded members in the House or Senate who cared deeply about 
Congress’s constitutional prerogatives. At the same time, these members were a fairly 
small minority and most members were subject to the collective action problem discussed 
earlier in this section. 
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within their respective party.47 Correspondingly, Republicans 
and Democrats are increasingly at odds with each other and 
increasingly unlikely to find common ground. Measures of 
ideology reveal that all or nearly all Republicans are more 
conservative than the most conservative Democrats.48 Likewise, 
with the demise of Northern Rockefeller Republicans and 
Southern Democrats, there is no meaningful ideological range 
within either party.49 
The rise in party-line voting exemplifies this phenomenon. 
Unlike the Nixon impeachment (where—even before the release 
of Watergate tapes—seven of seventeen Republicans joined 
House Democrats in voting for articles of impeachment),50 the 
“virtual party line votes in the House and the Senate” during the 
Clinton impeachment “reinforce[d] public perception of the 
intense partisanship underlying the proceedings.”51 The filibuster 
is another example. In November 2013, the then-Democratic 
Senate made it more likely that presidential lower court 
nominations would be approved by repealing the filibuster 
for those nominees; in April 2017, the Republican Senate 
likewise made it more likely that presidential Supreme Court 
nominations would be approved by repealing the Supreme Court 
filibuster rule.52 These examples, while striking, typify current 
practice: House Republicans vote with their party around 
 
 47 See Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration 
of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 756–59 (2011); see also C. LAWRENCE 
EVANS, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 238 
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001). 
 48 See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTE VIEW (Jan. 18, 2013), 
web.archive.org/web/20131116022958/http://polarizedamerica.com/political_polarization.asp. 
 49 See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and 
Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000, 47 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 305, 314–15 (2003). 
 50 See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political 
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 161, 255 (2007). Republicans and Democrats also came 
together in subpoenaing information from the executive and going to court to seek 
enforcement of that subpoena. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign 
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For additional discussion, see 
Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 600–01. 
 51 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 193 (2d ed. 2000). 
 52 See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), https://nyti.ms/17Qt6DG; see also Amy Davidson Sorkin, Gorsuch 
Wins, The Filibuster Loses, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
news/amy-davidson/gorsuch-wins-the-filibuster-loses [http://perma.cc/3PHE-CAEJ]. In 
September 2017, Senate Republicans threatened to do away with the so-called blue slip, a 
practice which allows Senators from the state of residence of a federal judicial nominee to 
delay or potentially block a vote on the nominee. See Karoun Demirjian, McConnell Wants 
to End Practice of Allowing Senators to Block Appeals Court Judges, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senate-gop-leader-wants-to-
end-practice-of-allowing-senators-to-block-circuit-court-judges/2017/09/13/d10aa028-98d9-
11e7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html?utm_term=.81217b34d9a0 [http://perma.cc/UQZ9-AR5U]. 
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ninety-two percent of the time and Senate Democrats vote with 
their party around ninety-four percent of the time.53 
When it comes to oversight and hearings, party identity is 
also key. Majority and minority staff no longer work together; 
each side, instead, calls witnesses who support preexisting party 
views.54 Oversight too is contingent on party identity. When the 
majority party is the same as the president, oversight is lax; 
when the government is divided, oversight is a top priority.55 
Correspondingly, the House majority is willing to seek judicial 
enforcement of subpoenas against high-ranking executive 
officials during periods of divided government. When Democrats 
controlled the House in 2007, the Bush administration’s firing of 
U.S. attorneys prompted extensive oversight and litigation.56 In 
the Fast and Furious gun running case of 2012–2013, 
Republicans targeted Obama Attorney General Eric Holder.57 In 
both these disputes, the minority filed competing briefs urging 
judicial restraint.58 
Party polarization, finally and most significantly, contributes 
both to the rise of presidential unilateralism and to Congress’s 
acquiescence to judicial supremacy. Members of the president’s 
party are unlikely to check presidential priorities and, 
consequently, the opposition party is unlikely to forge a 
bipartisan coalition to check presidential power.59 Moreover, the 
 
 53 Elahe Izadi, Congress Sets Record for Voting Along Party Lines, NAT’L. J. (Feb. 3, 
2014), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/62617 [http://perma.cc/9GLY-ND99]. 
 54 See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons 
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1544 (2005). 
 55 See Devins, supra note 37, at 409. 
 56 See Philip Shenon, As New ‘Cop on the Beat,’ Congressman Starts Patrol, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/us/politics/06waxman.html. 
 57 See John Bresnahan & Seung Min Kim, Holder Held in Contempt of Congress, 
POLITICO (June 28, 2012, 5:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/06/holder-held-in-
contempt-of-congress-077988 [http://perma.cc/8STK-YLEE]. Another manifestation of 
polarization’s impact on Executive Branch-Congress dynamics is the March 2018 decision 
of the Trump administration to turn over Obama-era documents on the Fast and Furious 
investigation to Republican-led Congress. See Sarah N. Lynch, Trump administration to 
provide records on Obama-era gun-smuggling probe, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2018, 9:21 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-guns/trump-administration-to-provide-
records-on-obama-era-gun-smuggling-probe-idUSKCN1GJ2KH [http://perma.cc/DL54-VBTK]. 
 58 See Jordy Yager, Dems File Brief Urging Court to Dismiss Issa’s Contempt Suit 
Against Holder, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:34 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house 
/273827-dems-file-brief-urging-court-to-dismiss-issas-contempt-suit-against-holder.com 
[http://perma.cc/MN5W-KP94]. The partisan divide in these cases stands in sharp 
contrast to the bipartisan efforts of the Watergate-era Congress to go to court to enforce a 
subpoena against President Nixon. For additional discussion, see supra note 50 and 
accompanying text. 
 59 I do not mean to suggest that the president’s party will never stand up to the 
president. In 2017, Republicans in Congress joined Democrats to back sanctions 
legislation against Russia for its meddling in the 2016 elections—legislation which was 
seen as a rebuke to President Trump. See Elana Schor, Congress Sends Russia 
Sanctions to Trump Desk, Daring a Veto, POLITICO (July 27, 2017, 1:55 PM), 
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prospects of both parties coming together to advance Congress’s 
institutional interests through the enactment of legislation is less 
likely in divided government (and we have had divided 
government thirty-six of the past fifty years). The result: 
presidents act unilaterally and Congress stands aside. Sometimes 
presidents advance new policies through executive orders (Clinton 
on health care; Bush on faith based initiatives; Obama on 
immigration);60 sometimes presidents take greater control of the 
administrative state through Office of Management and Budget 
regulatory review and related coordinating techniques.61 
Polarization facilitates judicial supremacy for much the same 
reason. Lawmakers are increasingly at odds about preferred 
policies; on matters before the courts, lawmakers—as I will soon 
discuss—increasingly file conflicting Democrat and Republican 
amicus briefs. Consequently, courts are emboldened, as it is close 
to unimaginable that lawmakers will stand together to advance 
pro-Congress positions in ways that courts would take into 
account.62 Polarization furthers judicial supremacy in other ways. 
For example, polarization has resulted in a shift of power away 
from congressional committees and to party leaders—so much 
so that committee hearings related to constitutional and 
statutory interpretation are now dominated by the court-centric 
Judiciary Committees.63 
B. Polarization and Amicus Briefs64  
Lawmakers regularly file amicus briefs in federal court 
litigation, especially before the Supreme Court. From 1974–1985, 
 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/27/russia-sanctions-bill-senate-to-pass-241034 
[http://perma.cc/TM7H-4FQH]. At the same time, my bottom line claim is valid, that is, 
today’s lawmakers rarely have incentive to check a president of their own party. Indeed, 
Congressional Republicans backed President Trump’s efforts to discredit his own 
Department of Justice and FBI by releasing memos and conducting oversight favorable to 
the president. See also infra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Republican 
support for President Trump during the first months of his presidency). For a provocative 
argument that Congress retains its core powers to check the president and that the 
failure to act speaks more about the situational use of power (rather than the diminution 
of power tied to polarization), see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: 
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017). 
 60 See Moe and Howell, supra note 4, at 165–66 (noting that only 3 of 1000 executive 
orders from 1973–1998 were overridden by legislation). For a more complete (and current) 
inventory, see WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF 
DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 112–20 (2003). 
 61 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2247–49 (2001). 
 62 See Devins, supra note 3, at 1518–19; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE 
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 14–17 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court calibrates its 
decisions to take into account the possibility of congressional disapproval). 
 63 See Devins, supra note 36, at 762–63.  
 64 This subsection is drawn from Devins, supra note 10. 
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930 lawmakers signed onto fifty-two briefs in forty-five cases; 
from 2002–2013, those numbers skyrocketed—3807 lawmakers 
signed onto one hundred fifty briefs in eighty-six cases.65 This 
spike in filings, however, does not speak to greater lawmaker 
interest in Congress’s institutional authority, nor greater 
congressional influence before the Court. In fact, differences 
between the less polarized 1974–1985 period and the highly 
polarized 2002–2013 period speak both to the rise of partisanship 
in lawmaker briefs and a shift away from less divisive separation 
of powers cases to salient divisive issues like abortion, health 
care, and gay rights. During the 1974–1985 period, fifteen briefs 
(twenty-nine percent) were filed on social issues and twenty 
(thirty-eight percent) were filed on institutional issues.66 During 
the 2002–2013 period, fifty-two (thirty-five percent) were filed on 
social issues and forty-three (twenty-nine percent) were filed on 
institutional issues.67 Individual lawmakers were twice as likely 
to sign onto social issue briefs (1822 lawmakers; forty-eight 
percent) than institutional briefs (926 signatories; twenty-four 
percent).68 In the earlier period, lawmakers signed onto 
comparable numbers of social and institutional issue briefs (388 
lawmakers, forty-two percent for social issue briefs; 372 
lawmakers, forty percent for institutional).69  
More striking, today’s lawmakers focus almost exclusively on 
the underlying policy dispute. Briefs are filed in cases that do not 
implicate congressional power (affirmative action and legislative 
prayer are two recent examples).70 The question of whether 
congressional power is expanded or limited is of secondary 
importance. Democrats backed the Affordable Care Act and 
campaign finance laws and opposed the Defense of Marriage Act; 
Republicans were on the opposite side of both issues.71 
A closer look at abortion and separation of powers filings 
backs up these claims. For abortion, lawmakers did not file any 
amicus briefs in cases implicating state regulatory authority 
until 1986; in 1980, a bipartisan coalition of 238 lawmakers (104 
Democrats, 135 Republicans) filed a brief arguing that lawmaker 
control over the appropriations process extended to the decision 
not to fund abortions.72 Starting in 1986, however, lawmakers 
 
 65 Id. at 942–43. 
 66 Id. at 945–46. 
 67 Id. at 946. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 995–96, 999–1000. 
 71 Id. at 992–94, 998–99.  
 72 See Brief of Rep. Jim Wright et al. as Amici Curiae, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980) (No. 79-1268), 1980 WL 339672, at *1–5. 
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began to file in state as well as federal cases; partisan divisions 
also emerged. Initially, competing briefs were filed by coalitions 
dominated by Republicans or Democrats (pro-choice briefs were 
ninety percent Democrats and pro-life briefs were ninety percent 
Republicans).73 By 2014, most briefs were exclusively Democrat 
or Republican filings. In the 2014 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case 
(involving the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act), 
four of five briefs were one party briefs.74 
Abortion briefs are striking for another reason—hundreds of 
lawmakers sign onto these briefs (an average of 171 signatories 
per case).75 In other words, lawmakers see abortion briefs as an 
opportunity to register a policy preference on an issue that 
divides the party. Lawmakers no longer care whether the 
underlying issue implicates state or federal power. More striking, 
even in cases implicating federal power, lawmakers now care 
only about pro-choice or pro-life preferences and not about the 
scope of federal power. Today, it is inconceivable that a broad 
bipartisan coalition would back legislative power—as they did in 
the 1980 abortion funding case.76 Instead, Democrats will resist 
federal power to restrict abortion rights and back federal power 
to guarantee abortion access; Republican views of federal power 
are likewise contingent on whether pro-choice or pro-life policy 
outcomes are at play. In the 2007 Gonzales v. Carhart case, 
for example, Republicans uniformly backed and Democrats 
uniformly resisted congressional power to impose a federal 
partial birth abortion ban.77 
Amicus filings in separation of powers cases highlight both 
the growth of partisanship and the declining importance of 
separation of powers issues to lawmakers. As noted, today’s 
lawmakers are less likely to participate in disputes implicating 
institutional power and less likely to sign onto briefs in cases 
where briefs are filed. While House and Senate counsel 
participation may deflate the number of signatories (a topic I will 
address in the next subsection), it is quite clear that there is less 
 
 73 Devins, supra note 10, at 947. 
 74 Id. at 948. 
 75 Id. One hundred and seventy-one is the average number of briefs studied in my 
earlier research on congressional amici. 
 76 In 2014, House Republican leadership filed a lawsuit against Obama 
administration implementation of the Affordable Care Act—claiming that the 
administration usurped Congress’s appropriations power. For their part, Democratic 
leadership filed competing briefs—advancing a narrower view of the appropriations 
power. See Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Defendants’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 
(D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01967-RMC), 2015 WL 10376844. 
 77 Devins, supra note 10, at 1014–15. All 152 Republican signatories supported the 
law. Ninety-nine out of one hundred and one Democrat signatories opposed. 
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interest in staking out a position in a separation of powers 
dispute than a case implicating abortion or some other social 
issue. For example, throughout the enemy combatant dispute, a 
total of sixteen lawmakers signed amicus briefs and no amicus 
briefs were filed by the House or Senate counsel.78 Additionally, 
when an amicus brief is filed, there are relatively few brief 
signers—roughly nineteen per brief as compared to 171 in 
abortion cases.79 
Separation of powers filings are revealing for other reasons.80 
First, there is a growing trend towards partisan filings; recent 
examples include George W. Bush litigation over enemy 
combatants, Barack Obama litigation over recess appointments 
and immigration, Donald Trump litigation over immigration.81 
Second, although some bipartisan briefs were filed, lawmakers 
were not motivated by a desire to preserve or expand 
congressional power. In litigation over the item veto in the 1990s, 
lawmakers defended delegating legislative power to the president 
in order to facilitate their reputations as deficit hawks.82 In 
related 2012 and 2014 litigation over the authority of Congress to 
allow individuals born in Jerusalem to list Israel as their place of 
birth, brief signers were interested in reaffirming their support 
for Israel.83 
Lawmaker amicus briefs reflect growing polarization in 
Congress, including growing lawmaker disinterest in issues 
implicating Congress’s institutional power. Moreover, with 
increasing attention paid to short-term goals tied to advancing 
party policy priorities, lawmakers are increasingly apt to 
file briefs highlighting limits in legislative power. Relatedly, 
today’s amicus briefs largely cancel each other out—coalitions 
of Democrats and Republicans make competing arguments 
about constitutionality so that there are roughly as many 
briefs arguing that Congress is without authority as arguing 
that Congress has constitutional authority. And if that isn’t 
enough—these briefs are further limited by the fact that 
Republicans and Democrats are inconsistent in their positions 
 
 78 Id. at 949. 
 79 Id. at 948. Nineteen is the average number of studied briefs in my 
earlier research. 
 80 The balance of this paragraph is largely lifted from id. at 949–50. 
 81 Id. at 949; see also Seung Min Kim, Dem Lawmakers Back Brief Supporting 
Obama’s Immigration Action, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2016/03/obama-immigration-action-democrats-amicus-brief-220419 [http://perma.cc/BH6G-
4L5N]; Tal Kopan, Congressional Democrats Join Court Challenge to Trump’s Travel Ban, 
CABLE NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 15, 2017, 3:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/politics/ 
democrats-amicus-brief-trump-travel-ban/index.html [http://perma.cc/9YT3-CFG4]. 
 82 Devins, supra note 10, at 949–50. 
 83 Id. at 950.  
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over time. The flashpoint in these briefs is the underlying 
policy issue and not the more abstract question regarding the 
scope of congressional power. For reasons I will now detail, 
changes in the role of institutional counsel in Congress also 
demonstrate growing partisanship and polarization in separation 
of powers disputes.  
C. Polarization and the Changing Role of Institutional Counsel 
Party polarization has reshaped the role of institutional 
counsel. Gone are the days where institutional counsel served as 
a bulwark against a too powerful executive—defending the House 
and Senate in separation of powers lawsuits, typically speaking 
the voice for both Democrats and Republicans.84 Indeed, in the 
period before polarization, lawmakers typically did not file 
amicus briefs and typically backed Congress as an institution 
when they did file amicus briefs.85 At that time, the House and 
Senate counsel often worked in tandem, participating in the 
same cases and advancing the shared institutional interests 
of the House and Senate in a strong Congress.86 Today, 
House-Senate differences are on prominent display as 
polarization has transformed the role of institutional counsel in 
ways that reflect profound differences between the House and 
Senate.  
The Senate counsel was designed to reflect Senate norms of 
bipartisanship and consensus. From 1978 (when the Office of 
Senate Legal Counsel was first created) until 1995, the Senate 
counsel regularly participated in litigation involving the 
separation of powers. However, polarization has made bipartisan 
consensus next to impossible; as a result, the Senate counsel is 
largely moribund in the very separation of powers disputes that 
were core to the creation of the office. With one notable exception 
(that I will soon discuss), the Senate counsel has not locked horns 
with the executive and defended congressional prerogatives 
before the Supreme Court in any separation of powers dispute 
since 1995.87 For example, in a 2014 dispute over the president’s 
 
 84 See Devins, supra note 10, at 950. 
 85 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 617; Devins, supra note 10, at 950. 
 86 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 614–22 (discussing efforts of House and 
Senate counsel to coordinate filings in separation of powers litigation). 
 87 See id. at 617; see also Neal Devins, Counsel Rests, SLATE (Jan. 13, 2014, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/01/the_senate_s_lawy
er_doesn_t_participate_in_important_litigation_against.html [http://perma.cc/3T3R-EU3N]. 
In a 2015 dispute regarding a federal statute intended to facilitate the collection of money 
judgments brought by victims of terrorists acts, the Senate Counsel and Department of 
Justice both filed amicus briefs backing up congressional authority. See Brief for the U.S. 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 
(2016) (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 9412676; Brief of Amici Curiae Former Senior Officials of 
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purported end-running of the Senate’s confirmation power 
through the use of recess appointments, the Senate counsel stood 
on the sidelines while counsel for Senate Republicans filed briefs 
and made oral arguments before both the D.C. Circuit and 
Supreme Court.88 
The one case where the Senate counsel did participate, 
Zivtofsky v. Kerry, is the exception that proves the rule. The issue 
in Zivtofsky was whether Congress could override State 
Department policy to disallow individuals born in Jerusalem to 
claim on their passports that they were born in Israel (so that 
their passports would designate their birthplace as Jerusalem 
and not Israel).89 Senate Democrats and Republicans did not 
come together to defend Senate prerogatives; they came together 
to support Israel. Lawmakers who signed amicus briefs in the 
case included some of the most liberal Democrats and some of the 
most conservative Republicans.90 These lawmakers regularly 
signed onto single party briefs in other cases, but were united in 
their support of Israel. Indeed, while 333 signatories of a pro-
Congress amicus brief signed a letter to President Obama 
affirming the “commitment to the unbreakable bond that exists 
between our country and the state of Israel,”91 no member of the 
Zivotofsky coalition spoke about the case’s separation of powers 
implications on either the House or Senate floor.92 
On the House side, polarization has played out in 
fundamentally different ways, reflecting the fact that the House 
counsel speaks the voice of the House majority. During periods of 
unified government, the House typically leaves the president 
alone—seeing the president as the leader of their party and 
 
the Office of Legal Counsel in Support of Respondents, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. 
Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 9412677. 
 88 See Devins, supra note 87. For their part, Senate Democrats too stood on the 
sidelines, not wanting to embrace a circumscribed confirmation power and not wanting to 
join Senate Republicans in their efforts to limit Obama administration efforts to fill 
judicial and administrative vacancies. Id. In Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Obama 
administration arguments and backed a larger Senate role.  
 89 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081–83 (2015). The Supreme Court ruled 
that the president has complete power of recognition and that Congress cannot override 
that power by statute. Id. at 2096. 
 90 Devins, supra note 10, at 954. 
 91 Letter by Representatives Steny Hoyer and Eric Cantor to Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton Reaffirming the U.S.-Israel Alliance, AIPC (Mar. 26, 2010), 
https://www.aipac.org/-/media/publications/policy-and-politics/source-materials/congress 
ional-action/2010/3_26_10__letter_to_secretary_of_state_re_us_commitment_to_israeli_ 
security_and_middle_east_peace.ashx. That letter was sent by 333 House members; a 
nearly identical letter was sent by seventy-six Senators. See Ben Smith, 76 Senators Sign 
on to Israel Letter, POLITICO (Apr. 13, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/ben-
smith/2010/04/76-senators-sign-on-to-israel-letter-026380 [http://perma.cc/N5GN-Y4CG]. 
 92 Devins, supra note 10, at 954. 
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someone to shield from opposition party criticism.93 Oversight is 
lax and the president and House speaker sound similar messages 
on the issues that divide the parties. Needless to say, the House 
counsel is not engaged in litigation disputes with the White 
House during periods of unified government.94 
During periods of divided government, however, the House is 
increasingly willing to challenge presidential actions in court, 
including lawsuits against presidential initiatives and subpoena 
enforcement actions. As discussed earlier, the Democratic House 
sought to enforce subpoenas against the George W. Bush 
administration and the Republican House likewise sought to 
enforce subpoenas against the Obama administration.95 More 
telling, the Republican House challenged Obama administration 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act, claiming that the 
administration “spent billions of unappropriated dollars to 
support the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” and that 
“under the guise of implementing regulations, effectively 
amended the Affordable Care Act’s employer mandate by 
delaying its effect and narrowing its scope.”96 The House too has 
pursued the defense of federal statutes that the executive refuses 
to defend. Recent examples include Miranda override legislation 
 
 93 The Trump administration may ultimately become the exception that proves the 
rule. At least until January 2018, however, Republicans in Congress—notwithstanding 
some public criticism of the president—have largely backed President Trump and 
certainly Republican lawmakers have not gone to court to challenge the president. See 
Aaron Bycoffe, Tracking Congress in the Age of Trump, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 14, 2016 
3:24 PM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/ [http://perma.cc/ 
CG7L-YBV3]. Indeed, House Republicans backed President Trump’s efforts to discredit 
his own bureaucracy by releasing a memo critical of the FBI. See supra note 59. At the 
same time, there is reason to think that Republicans in Congress may see personal 
advantage in criticizing the president and, as such, Congress may eventually step up its 
oversight of the Trump administration. In late September 2017, for example, Republican 
House overseers joined Democrats in seeking information regarding Trump 
administration officials’ use of personal emails to conduct government business. See Mike 
DeBonis, Gowdy Joins Democrats in Probing Trump Administration’s Use of Personal 
Email, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/ 
wp/2017/09/25/gowdy-joins-democrats-in-probing-trump-administration-use-of-personal-
email/?utm_term=.174e3bea8e4a [http://perma.cc/EKE6-7ZAC]. 
 94 The only exception is a low salience separation of powers dispute regarding the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act in 1993. See Memorandum from Jennifer Casazza, DOJ 
Decline Defense Congressional Participation 6 (on file with author) (discussing the House 
Counsel’s participation in Association of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 
997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
 95 See Shenon, supra note 56; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57. 
 96 U.S. House of Representatives. v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2015). 
The House also appeared as amicus in backing a state challenge to Obama administration 
immigration initiatives. For additional discussion, see Brief for 172 Members of the U.S. 
House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, infra note 106. 
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(Dickerson v. United States) and the Defense of Marriage Act 
(United States v. Windsor).97 
Dickerson and Windsor reveal the profound impact of 
polarization on the work of the House counsel. In periods of 
divided government, the House counsel will advance majority 
party preferences. In part, this means that the House counsel 
will engage in disputes that have nothing to do with the 
separation of powers—as the focus is advancing the policy 
agenda of the House (and, for reasons discussed, separation of 
powers gives way to social issues when Congress is polarized).98 
In part, this means that the minority party in Congress will 
publicly take issue with the House counsel. In both Dickerson 
and Windsor, the House minority filed a competing brief to make 
clear that the House counsel was both wrong on the merits and 
spoke only for the majority party.99 Institutional power disputes 
follow a similar script. The minority party will make competing 
filings and the House counsel will focus her energies on highly 
politicized matters, especially investigations intended to 
embarrass high-ranking Executive Branch officials. Recent 
examples include Democratic investigations of the U.S. 
Attorneys’ firings under George W. Bush and Republican 
investigations of Attorney General Eric Holder’s handling of the 
Fast and Furious gun smuggling scheme.100 
In today’s polarized Congress, the House and Senate counsel 
no longer represent Congress’s institutional interests in disputes 
with the president. The Senate counsel is largely enfeebled by 
bipartisanship requirements. The House counsel represents the 
majority party and is only interested in checking the president 
during periods of divided government. Moreover, the House 
counsel largely limits her intervention to highly politicized 
disputes that divide Republicans and Democrats—so much 
so that the minority party increasingly rebuts House counsel 
filings with opposition briefs. Finally, as was true with 
lawmaker amicus filings, institutional disputes are less critical 
to institutional counsel and the social issues that divide the 
 
 97 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 98 See Shenon, supra note 56; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57. 
 99 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the House Democratic Leadership in Support of 
Petitioner, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), 2000 WL 
126192; Jennifer Bendery, Defense of Marriage Act: House Republicans Tie Federal Gay 
Marriage Ban to House Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/01/02/defense-of-marriage-act_n_2399383.html [http://perma.cc/3XJR-ZC64]. 
 100 See Shenon, supra note 56; Brian Montopoli, So Is This U.S. Attorney 
Purge Unprecedented Or Not?, CBS NEWS (Mar. 14, 2007, 5:17 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/so-is-this-us-attorney-purge-unprecedented-or-not/ 
[http://perma.cc/73UP-WEHQ]; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57. 
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parties are increasingly likely to spill over to the work of 
institutional counsel.  
III. CONCLUSION: WHY EXPANDING LAWMAKER STANDING IS NOT 
THE SOLUTION TO CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION  
In turning back a lawsuit by members of Congress who 
challenged the Reagan administration for subverting Congress’s 
war making powers by backing the Contras, then-judge Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg claimed that “Congress has formidable weapons 
at its disposal—the power of the purse and investigative 
resources far beyond those available in the Third Branch. . . . ‘If 
the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our 
task to do so.’”101 This claim made sense in 1985 and even in 1993 
when Judge Ginsburg was confirmed to the Supreme Court by a 
resounding bipartisan vote of 96–3;102 at that time, the seeds of 
polarization were planted but had not yet taken hold of Congress. 
Today, the natural disinclinations of lawmakers to invest in 
Congress as an institution have metastasized. The era of 
presidential unilateralism has now taken hold as Congress lacks 
the will and way to check the president and advance its 
institutional interests.103 
The question remains: Should the courts fill that void by 
providing avenues for disappointed lawmakers to challenge the 
president? After all, our system of checks and balances 
anticipates some check on presidential unilateralism and judicial 
intervention seems far more likely than Congress coming 
together in a bipartisan way to place limits on presidential 
entreaties. For institutionally minded lawmakers, court filings 
may be the only real vehicle available to check the president’s 
expansionist tendencies.  
For the balance of this essay, I will explain why 
polarization does not cut in favor of an expanded judicial 
role—notwithstanding the fact that polarization cuts against 
 
 101 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir 1985) (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring). 
 102 Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 96-3, Easily Confirms Judge Ginsburg as a Justice, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/04/us/senate-96-3-easily-
affirms-judge-ginsburg-as-a-justice.html. 
 103 As noted earlier, the Trump administration may become the exception that proves 
this rule. See Moe & Howell, supra note 4, at 138. Republicans (as of January 2018) are 
generally backing the president and, consequently, reinforcing the central claims of this 
essay. That may change and that change may add nuance to the claims made in this 
paper. Nonetheless, I truly doubt that the actions of Congress during the Trump era will 
undermine my central claims regarding congressional incentives. Furthermore, a tick up 
in congressional oversight would cut in favor of my bottom line conclusions regarding 
legislator standing to challenge the executive in court.  
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Congress asserting its institutional prerogatives through the 
legislative process. My argument is two-fold. First, lawmakers 
will increasingly turn to the courts for partisan ends and, 
relatedly, it is increasingly likely that there will be competing 
factions of Democratic and Republican filings. In other words, 
lawmakers will see courts as one more vehicle to articulate party 
preferences and call attention to differences between the two 
parties. These lawmakers speak for their political party; they do 
not speak Congress’s institutional voice. 
Consider four recent cases where the House of Representatives 
squared off against the Obama administration—Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder (where the 
House sued Attorney General Holder for failing to turn over 
requested documents in its Fast and Furious investigation); 
United States House of Representatives v. Burwell (where the 
House sued the Obama administration for implementing the 
Affordable Care Act in ways that allegedly undermined House 
prerogatives); United States v. Windsor (where the House 
defended before the Supreme Court the DOMA after the Obama 
administration refused to defend); and United States v. Texas 
(where the House appeared before the Supreme Court as amicus 
to challenge Obama’s immigration directive).104 In all four cases, 
Republican lawmakers sought to embarrass the Obama 
administration and/or advance favored policy priorities in the 
courts;105 in all four cases, Democratic lawmakers filed competing 
briefs defending the Obama administration.106 Needless to say, if 
Democrats controlled the House there would be a raft of lawsuits 
challenging the Trump administration.107 Indeed, Democratic 
 
 104 See Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2013); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2016); United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 105 See Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 56 (discussing Holder); see also Burwell, 130 F. 
Supp. 3d 53; Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618–19 (discussing DOMA); Brief for 
Amicus Curiae the United States House of Representatives in Support of Respondents, 
United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL 1377718. 
 106 See Yager, supra note 58; Brief of Amicus Curiae Members of Congress in Support 
of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 
130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01967-RMC), 2015 WL 10376844; Brief of 
172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging Affirmance on the 
Merits, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 840029; 
Brief of 186 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 39 Members of the U.S. 
Senate as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 
(5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-647), 2016 WL 891342. 
 107 For this very reason, there are real costs to a regime in which institutional counsel 
for the House have standing to speak the House’s voice without allowing minority party 
lawmakers access to the courts to raise institutional power claims. Specifically, during 
periods of unified government, Congress would be mute. See Bycoffe, supra note 93. 
During periods of divided government, Congress would be active—but only presidential 
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state Attorneys Generals have launched more than a dozen 
lawsuits against the Trump administration and Democrats in 
Congress have also launched lawsuits.108 For example, almost 
200 Congressional Democrats have filed a lawsuit claiming that 
President Trump violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause by 
accepting benefits from foreign states without first seeking to 
obtain the consent of Congress.109  
There is little question that opposition party lawmakers are 
now locked and loaded; they will go to court whenever possible to 
strengthen their base, advance their agenda, and—whenever 
possible—embarrass the president. None of this is to say that the 
House and Senate never have standing to defend institutional 
prerogatives. Indeed, I have previously written (with Tara Grove) 
that House and Senate counsel can seek judicial enforcement of 
subpoenas.110 In particular, the House and Senate need not act as 
a bicameral body when it comes to implementing the “rules 
of . . . proceedings” of their respective chambers;111 it therefore 
 
opponents would speak Congress’s voice. To the extent that the Supreme Court signaled 
potential approval of such a regime in Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2015), the Court should rethink its approach to lawmaker 
and institutional standing. For further discussion of the Arizona case, see Sant’Ambrogio, 
supra note 2, at 1540. 
 108 See Michael Levenson, Maura Healey’s Top Target These Days is Donald Trump, 
BOS. GLOBE (June 24, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/23/healey/ 
8C3t7IXZZWENRHKllVqbIK/story.html [http://perma.cc/R9ET-ZK63]. For a particularly 
revealing look at the efforts of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s efforts to 
wage legal warfare with President Trump, see Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, 
New York’s Attorney General in Battle with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/26/nyregion/eric-schneiderman-attorney-general-new-
york.html?_r=0. 
 109 See Blumenthal v. Trump, Complaint, No. 17-cv-01154, 2017 WL 2561946 (D.D.C. 
June 14, 2017). A related lawsuit filed by the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington was dismissed for want of standing. See David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan 
O’Connell, Judge dismisses lawsuit alleging Trump violated Constitution, WASH. POST, 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judge-dismisses-lawsuit-
alleging-trump-violated-constitution/2017/12/21/31011510-e697-11e7-ab50-621fe058 
8340_story.html?utm_term=.0c2df9144622 [http://perma.cc/V78R-PK6C]. 
 110 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 597–603, 622. The House also may have 
standing in ongoing (as of fall 2017) litigation regarding the appropriations power and 
Obama-era enforcement of the Affordable Care Act. Specifically, since the Constitution 
mandates that appropriations legislation originates in the House, the House arguably 
suffers a distinct injury when presidential action allegedly undermines House 
appropriations authority. In Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 58, federal district judge 
Rosemary Collyer found standing for this reason. On December 15, 2017, Collyer’s 
standing holding was effectively ratified by a settlement between the Trump 
administration, House Republicans, and Democractic Attorneys General. See Anna Edney 
& Andrew M. Harris, Obamacare Subsidy Lawsuit Settled by White House, Democrats, 
BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Dec. 15, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-12-15/obamacare-subsidy-lawsuit-settled-by-white-house-democrats 
[http://perma.cc/6WEC-X5FK]. 
 111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The fact that either chamber might have authority to 
seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas does not mean that judicial resolution is superior 
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stands to reason that each chamber can pursue investigations as 
well as issue and enforce subpoenas as a unilateral body. At the 
same time, these lawsuits come at a cost in this age of polarized 
politics. Lawmakers are not motivated to use litigation to 
advance Congress’s institutional interests; the focus of litigation 
is partisan gain and Democrats and Republicans will simply use 
the courts as another field of battle to engage in partisan battles 
with each other. Again, that is not to say that lawmakers or 
institutional counsel are without standing; my concern is 
whether polarization—as a policy matter—weighs in favor or 
against congressional standing. 
My second argument against congressional lawsuits is that 
they embroil the courts in highly partisan political fights and 
that the courts pay a price for being embroiled in such overtly 
political litigation. Starting in 2010, the Supreme Court became a 
partisan Court—all of the Republican-nominated Justices are 
now to the right of all of the Democratic-nominated Justices.112 
Polarization has fueled this partisan divide and Senate 
Democrats and Republicans have both exacerbated this divide by 
engaging in party-line voting on judicial nominees and, relatedly, 
by ending the filibuster.113 When Barack Obama was president 
and Democrats controlled the Senate, Democrats broke a 
Republican logjam on lower court nominees by ending the 
filibuster for such nominees.114 When Republicans gained control, 
they blocked Obama’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland 
by claiming that the 2016 election should decide who appoints 
the next Supreme Court Justice.115 And after Democrats 
filibustered Trump nominee Neil Gorsuch, the majority 
Republican Senate ended the filibuster of Supreme Court 
nominees and confirmed Gorsuch on a near party line vote.116 
 
to informal political bargaining. See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information 
Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110, 130–32 (1996). 
 112 See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization 
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301 (2017).  
 113 Id. at 323–25. 
 114 Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters 
on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/ 
2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0fd2ca728e67c_story.html?utm_term=5cf247d3b95a 
[http://perma.cc/GJ4F-AZDA]. 
 115 Mitch McConnell & Chuck Grassley, McConnell and Grassley: Democrats 
Shouldn’t Rob Voters of Chance to Replace Scalia, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mcconnell-and-grassley-democrats-shouldnt-rob-
voters-of-chance-to-replace-scalia/2016/02/18/e5ae9bdc-d68a-11e5-be55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story. 
html?utm_term=.b97a5e7c3539 [http://perma.cc/F6KX-9PXB]. 
 116 Russell Berman, Republicans Abandon the Filibuster to Save Neil Gorsuch, 
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/ 
republicans-nuke-the-filibuster-to-save-neil-gorsuch/522156/ [http://perma.cc/A4LD-9G66]. 
Senate Republicans also did away with the blue slip (allowing home state Senators to 
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Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the 
courts—especially the Supreme Court—are increasingly seen 
as another political, partisan institution.117 The Court, as the 
Justices have recognized, must “speak and act in ways that allow 
people to accept its decisions.”118 Indeed, to preserve their 
reputation as a collegial court, most Supreme Court Justices 
have spoken against the politicization of the Judiciary.119 
Correspondingly, after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, the 
Justices committed themselves to deciding cases unanimously 
and to avoid partisan 4–4 deadlocks.120 
Judicial resolution of congressional lawsuits cuts against 
these efforts of the Court to preserve its reputation as a court of 
law. For reasons discussed, congressional lawsuits are 
increasingly likely to be seen as partisan. And while some of these 
lawsuits will be filed by institutionalists interested in defending 
Congress’s constitutional prerogatives, it is nonetheless the case 
that judicial rulings on President Trump and the Emoluments 
Clause, or President Obama’s implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act, will both be seen as partisan and will dwarf nonpartisan 
efforts to, say, preserve Congress’s war-making authority. Again, 
it may be that lawmakers or institutional counsel already possess 
 
block judicial nominees) when then-Senator Al Franken sought to hold up the nomination 
of Seventh Circuit judge David Stras. See Kevin Freking, Senate confirms David Stras for 
Court of Appeals despite Al Franken withholding support, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS 
(Jan. 30, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2018/01/30/senate-confirms-david-stras-
for-court-of-appeals-despite-al-franken-withholding-support/ [http://perma.cc/S4JZ-SGYA]. 
 117 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court is a Political Court. Republicans’ Actions 
are Proof, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
supreme-court-is-a-political-court-republicans-actions-are-proof/2016/03/09/4c851860-e142-
11e5-8d98-4b3d9215ade1_story.html?utm_term=.c21993986959 [http://perma.cc/8B6n-Z3G2]. 
 118 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). In quoting this language, I do not mean to suggest that the Court does 
or should follow public opinion. 
 119 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, The Political Wars Damage Public Perception of the 
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/the-political-wars-damage-public-
perception-of-supreme-court-chief-justice-roberts-says/2016/02/04/80e718b6-cb0c-11e5-
a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html?utm_term=.1723d547a198 [http://perma.cc/725G-A48V]; 
Ryan Lovelace, Sonia Sotomayor Saddened by Perception of Judges as Political, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Mar. 10, 2017, 10:42 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/Sonia-sotomayor-
saddened-by-perception-of-judges-as-political/article/2617019 [http://perma.cc/ZUY4-W8FE]; 
Catherine Lutz, Justice Elena Kagan Talks Power on the Supreme Court, ASPEN INST. 
(July 18, 2017), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/ supreme-court-associate-justice-
elena-kagan-power-court/ [http://perma.cc/93MK-DPM4]; Lincoln Caplan, A Workable 
Democracy, HARV. MAG. (Mar.–Apr. 2017), http://harvardmagazine.com/2017/03/a-workable-
democracy [http://perma.cc/7LTC-2TBX]. 
 120 See Adam Liptak, Rulings and Remarks Tell Divided Story of an 8-Member 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/ 
us/politics/rulings-and-remarks-tell-divided-story-of-an-8-member-supreme-court.html; 
Adam Liptak, A Cautious Supreme Court Sets a Modern Record for Consensus, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-
term-consensus.html. 
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constitutional standing to bring such suits. Nonetheless, party 
polarization cuts against the bringing of those lawsuits and is 
reason for the courts to move cautiously before expanding 
congressional standing.121 
In arguing against congressional standing, I understand full 
well that I am embracing presidential unilateralism. As Justice 
Jackson wrote in the Steel Seizure case, “[t]he tools belong to the 
man who can use them.”122 Congress is not likely to use its tools; it 
is naturally disinclined to stand up for institutional prerogatives 
and party polarization further cuts against Congress asserting its 
prerogatives. Nonetheless, the courts should not seek to prop 
Congress up by intervening in cases where standing is not clearly 
established. Today’s Congress is a cacophony of competing sound 
bites by Democrats and Republicans. Amicus curiae filings by 
lawmakers and institutional counsel provide an appropriate 
vehicle for the expression of the myriad interests of lawmakers 
and political parties. Congressional lawsuits are not such a 
vehicle; those lawsuits further expose partisan rifts in Congress 
and are potentially harmful to the courts’ institutional standing. 
 
 
 121 The courts are generally reluctant to intervene and look for ways to avoid tackling 
the merits in these disputes. Indeed, federal courts often seek end-runs where they do 
not have to rule on standing. This is true of information access disputes. See 
Complaint, supra note 109. It is also true of ongoing litigation regarding the 
appropriations power—where the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is holding the case in 
abeyance (starting December 5, 2016) rather than ruling on the lower court’s standing 
determination. In this litigation, the House and Trump administration both support the 
D.C. Circuit’s action. See Timothy Jost, Parties Ask Court to Keep Cost Sharing Reduction 
Payment Litigation on Hold (Updated), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2017), 
http://healthaffairs.org/ blog/2017/02/21/parties-ask-court-to-keep-cost-sharing-reduction-
payment-litigation-on-hold/ [http://perma.cc/2QUV-XPXE]. 
 122 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
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